1. The development of Poland's foreign policy over the past decade is most fully illustrated by the well-known saying that the foreign policy of a state largely depends on its internal political system. The year 1989 had deep impact on Polish foreign policy. Internal independence was evolving parallel to independence in international relations. The discarding of ideological ties made it possible for democratic Poland to determine in a sovereign way its place in its immediate regional environment and a broader geopolitical context.

The direct consequences of such development are clear and explicit:

• Poland – from the outset of changes in its internal policy – created a solid basis for relations with its neighbors, concluding treaties on good-neighborly relations (they confirmed the existing borders, defined the main directions of cooperation, assigned due significance to human rights, including the protection of national minorities),
• Poland joined a number of international organizations, thus confirming its membership of the group of democratic states with stable market economy (membership of NATO, OECD and the Council of Europe),
• Poland became actively involved in the process of European integration through association with the European Communities and its clearly stated goal of the quickest possible membership of the European Union;
• Poland became the forerunner of efforts to promote regional cooperation – the concepts of the Visegrad Group, Weimar Triangle, Baltic Sea cooperation have gained significance in international European relations;
• Poland also adopted all the international standards of the protection of human rights and vigorously campaigned for their further development - it should be remembered that the formula of the protection of national minority rights in bilateral relations, strictly subordinated to CSCE/OSCE standards (which was applied for the first time precisely in Poland's bilateral treaties with its neighbors, concluded in the early 90's) became the point of departure for solving these extremely complicated problems in all of Central Europe.

2. This aspect of the relationship between the political system of a state and the foreign policy it conducts is relatively obvious and does not require further elaboration. However, I would like to focus on another aspect of this issue: impact of the international sphere, the broadly perceived international standards – on the political system of a state.

Someone could claim that this is not a problem for a foreign minister, but rather for a parliamentarian, an expert in constitutional law, a legislator or administrator. However, that objection would not be valid for at least two reasons.

First – it is a phenomenon of contemporary development of international relations that international standards are increasingly making inroads directly into the internal sphere of a state, hitherto jealously guarded; one could point here to the direct impact of the international standards of protection of human rights, which a citizen can invoke without regard to national law, not to mention the influence of Community law (the scope of the adjustments required in connection with Poland's impending membership of the European Union is a telling example of that);

Second - this phenomenon has brought on the new trend of "socializing"

the foreign policy. Foreign policy is no longer a domain reserved for a small group of insiders and the object of secretive, backroom deals and pacts.

At present, the foreign minister is just one – doubtless, important – figure influencing a state's foreign policy. Every government - regardless whether it likes it or not – must take into account universal (or using modern terminology – global) circumstances; thanks to modern global telecom systems , information is universally accessible faster than the time it takes to send a coded message from an embassy to the foreign ministry; in every democratic system opposition political parties closely follow the conduct of the government and immediately take issue with all departures from international standards. Animated activity is conducted by non-governmental organizations, which number thousands and which become involved in important spheres of international relations (from environment protection on an international scale, to protection of human rights); transnational corporations have appeared on the international scene, and their economic and thus - political – potential is often comparable with that of medium-sized countries.

I do not invoke all these circumstance to lament the difficult lot of a foreign minister. On the contrary, I believe that these are objective phenomena, reflecting – on the one hand – a qualitative change in internal democracy and its links with international standards, and on the other – a qualitative change in international relations themselves. This requires a corresponding, qualitative transformation in the work of a state's foreign service and all the rules governing the shaping and conduct of the state's foreign policy in the strict sense of the word, i.e. drawn up by state organs.

The interdependence between democracy and foreign policy has for decades been

the subject of disputes between theoreticians of international relations and political scientists. According to Samy Cohen (Democratie et politique etrangere. Repenser les terms du debat) the dispute is between two groups of views, represented by the so-called realists and idealists.

"The realists", whose opinions are derived from Hobbes, Locke and Tocqueville, believe that democracy can hardly be reconciled with foreign policy. They stress that diplomacy is not practiced in the street, since it requires a certain minimum of secrecy and competence on the part of its executors. Also, public opinion is not adequately versed in matters of international affairs and is capable of "impetuous reactions". One of the foremost exponents of this trend, Hans Morgenthau, in his famous work "Politics Among Nations" explained why public opinion should not be allowed to become involved in shaping foreign policy. He wrote:

"The statesman must take the long view...The popular mind wants quick results...a government...must resist the temptation to sacrifice what it considers good policy upon the altar of public opinion, abdicating leadership and exchanging short-lived political advantage for the permanent interests of the country." (Hans Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations", New York 1978, p.147).

"The idealists", on the other hand, want "socialization" and democratization of foreign policy – meaning that it should be brought closer to citizens, and that foreign policy should be subjected to parliamentary control not only a posteriori, but also a priori.

The dynamics of political life have resolved this dispute once and for all, though obviously a certain margin of confidentiality, personal trust and direct relations of politicians, especially at the level statesmen, are essential and remain an important component of the decision-making process.

The phenomenon of the ever broader and more decisive "incursions" of international standards into the internal sphere of states naturally provokes various discussions. It is understandable that they cumulate in states undergoing economic and political transformations, including Poland, and that they focus on the concept of sovereignty.

Before further exposition, I would like to point out one significant circumstance: under communist rule, one of the chief consequences of the domination of ideology over politics and morality in international relations was the persistent striving of the regime to prevent any influence of the individual on foreign policy, and to prevent the individual becoming a subject of recognized international standards. The state, ruled by the only (ideologically) legitimate political group, was to be the sole agent in international relations. The state was to be the only party to international obligations, it was the state that was to decide "what was due in this field" to the citizens. Let us recall the dramatic disputes during the 80's concerning trade union pluralism, or the attempts to invoke the international human rights standards!

All that has changed profoundly as a result of the systemic changes in Poland. Some of the first rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court after 1989 precisely concerned guarantees that everyone who was in Poland could invoke international standards before a court, if he felt that his due rights had been violated.

Apart from the legal aspects of the matter, this is a deep expression of embracing democratic values and morality. For, it places the individual at the center of foreign policy.

At the same time this phenomenon is but an emanation of the independence of a state: in other words – opening up to international standards is nothing more than implementation by the state of its sovereignty, and not ( as some would have it) its "restriction" or "infringement".

This should be remembered, for, in the heat of political discussion the broader context is often lost and arguments are used that fortunately have already been relegated to the rubbish heap of history. For, sovereignty is not tantamount to arbitrariness, voluntarism and cavalier conduct in the spirit of "my home is my castle". The author of the modern approach to sovereignty, French lawyer Jean Bodin, already in the late 16th century stated that "sovereignty" had to be subordinated to divine and natural law, and lex omnium gentium communis, or international law.

4. As I have stressed, the impact of "the international sphere" on the state and "the socialization" of foreign policy has - or, in any case, ought to have - significant systemic consequences. For, a response to the fore-mentioned dilemma concerning the sovereignty of the state must contain, alongside a theoretical and philosophical assessment, also a catalogue of essential systemic undertakings, guaranteeing democratic legitimacy of the state's participation in international relations. Only then such a response will be comprehensive. Otherwise, various accusations and doubts will be justified.

Let us take, as the most emphatic example, Poland's progress toward membership of the European Union, which - because of the scope of interference of the Union acquis in all state spheres – has given rise to justified controversy already in the pre-accession stage. And it is here that particular tension appears between state sovereignty, perceived in terms of international law as a guarantee of the state's independence in international relations and exclusivity of its internal competencies - and national sovereignty, perceived in terms of constitutional law as guarantee, that state authority derives its legitimacy through democratically expressed will of the people.

The point is that the process of integration creates the possibility of a broad involvement of the state in decision-making, thus permitting optimum, constructive coordination between the process of integration, state sovereignty and national sovereignty. The momentum of development of the integration structures clearly indicates that such possibilities will continue to grow. It is up to each state to ensure that it makes use of these opportunities.

In the case of Poland, as I have noted, the most important issue at the present stage of progress toward the European Union is ensuring maximum democratic legitimacy for the whole process of accession. This incorporates the following fundamental elements, which certainly do not exhaust the full list of problems.

First - it is important to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of the very decision to accede to the European Union. The 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland fully guarantees such legitimacy, which finds its expression in the provisions involving the parliament in the relevant decision-making process (article 90 par.2 of the Constitution), or making it possible to hold a national referendum on the matter (article 90, par.3 and 4 of the Constitution).

Second - it is essential to ensure the fullest possible involvement of the parliament in the accession process. This is taking place, and developments in recent months - particularly the tripartite agreement between the two chambers of parliament and the government, and the establishment of the European law commission - are an eloquent example of this. It is also necessary to ensure the participation of the opposition parties in integration decisions. But the participation of the parliament in the pre-accession process is not everything. For, it should be taken into consideration that, as a result of Poland's accession to the European Union, a substantial part of legislative competencies (hitherto reserved for the parliament) will be transferred to Union bodies. Therefore, a durable mechanism should be created in the foreseeable future, involving the parliament in the integration decision-making process, and in particular - guaranteeing smooth cooperation between the parliament and government.

Third - this problem also implies involving local and regional structures in the integration decision-making process. The administrative and self-government reform addresses this postulate, though much still remains to be done. It should be realized, that success of these reforms, institutional and staff preparation precisely at the regional and local levels, and the possibility of articulating regional needs and interests in the process of attaining membership of the European Union, will have fundamental influence on the pace of the accession process. On the other hand - it will have decisive impact on Poland obtaining its proper place among the member states of the Union.

I have addressed these problems at some length, to demonstrate the depth of changes occurring in the concept of sovereignty during the process of integration.

And these are changes which bring with them quite new possibilities for the average citizen: he becomes empowered in international relations, his status in relation to national institutions is greatly enhanced, and the individual becomes the main point of reference for systemic changes. State and national sovereignty assumes a new dimension.

5. Preparing this lecture, I reacquainted myself with a speech by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, in which - as the newly-appointed minister of foreign affairs in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki - he presented the first outline of the foreign policy of independent Poland.

Taking part in the general debate of the 44th session of the UN General Assembly in New York, on September 25, 1989, Skubiszewski emphasized:

"...we have a vision of peace and freedom in a region, which in modern times has all too frequently been an arena of conflicts, divisions and domination. If Poland is free and democratic, its geopolitical and geostrategic significance can and should become a valuable contribution to maintaining peace and consolidating freedom. Till recently, the ideological factor played a significant role in international relations, and certainly in relations between many countries. At present, this role has been considerably restricted and the present Polish government welcomes this change. We shall strive for complete elimination of ideology from international relations, which does not mean that we reject international morality. Ideology and morality are two different things. Morality and respect for the individual remain our supreme value."

These words are concordant with the values, which - I believe - should guide the foreign policy of every state. When over 14 years ago, on October 5, 1986, I made a speech in Frankfurt am Main, on the occasion of receiving the Peace Prize of the German Booksellers, it was no accident that its motto was "There is no peace without freedom". In the address I invoked the following statements of Karl Jaspers, one of the greatest German minds of the 20th century:

"First : external peace cannot be preserved without internal peace in people.

Second: peace - only through freedom.

Third: freedom - only through truth."

When those words were uttered, it was not clear what the future held in store for Poland or its neighbors. In subsequent years, the road through truth toward freedom in Poland also became the road to freedom and peace in the entire region, and in consequence - that "valuable contribution" to consolidating freedom and peace in Europe, even if not everyone remembers this today, or wants to remember.

I shall not ponder whether my remarks qualify me as a "realist" or "idealist". However, in conclusion, I would like to state that the foreign policy of a state:

- must be a peaceful policy;

- in order to be a peaceful policy - it must be based on freedom, it must respect freedom of the individual and the independence of other nations;

- in order for the policy of a state to respect the freedom of the individual and independence of another nation - it must subscribe to the fundamental values: truth and morality.

Despite various meanders during the process of transformations, Poland - in its foreign policy - has retained the direction set in the second half of 1989. As a result, Poland's geographic position is beginning to benefit Europe, the region of Central Europe, as well as Poland itself and its citizens.