Mister President,
Mister Prime Minister,
Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,
I take the floor with certain anxiety and
diffidence. For it is the first time that I stand on this rostrum as the
newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. What is more, I am to present
to the House the priorities and tenets of Polish foreign policy prepared
under your leadership, Mister Speaker, when you were executing the office of
the Minister of Foreign Affairs with such success.
My address opens the fourth and last
annual debate on foreign policy during this term of the Sejm. We have
entered an election year. That is significant, since the clear line formerly
separating domestic and international affairs has become blurred in our
times. I mention this, because I would like to explain in the beginning
that it is not my intention to become involved in any way in the
pre-election campaign. The national interest of the Polish
State obligate us to treat
external policy and its instrument – diplomacy – in a way transcending party
lines. I wish to ensure optimum effectiveness of our actions and continuity
in all the undertakings initiated by Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski in the
autumn of 1989, and advanced over the next 15 years by his successors –
Andrzej Olechowski, Władysław Bartoszewski, Dariusz Rosati, Bronisław
Geremek and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz.
Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,
With those assumptions in mind, I wish to
present a list of priorities on the agenda of our foreign policy.
First, we shall continue
consolidating our place in the European Union as a responsible state, for
which the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and
Defence Policy is a platform, on the one hand, for seeking a balance of
interests, and on the other – for overcoming the still existent divisions
and preventing new ones. We shall strive for a European Union budget for the
years 2007-2013 that meets Poland’s interests. It
is our goal to ensure the highest possible allocation for the policy of
cohesion and agricultural policy for the new member states – so that the new
budget accelerates the leveling of differences in the development of EU
states. We shall seek to attain political compromise on the New Financial
Perspective in June 2005. That is a difficult task. However, we hope that
the negotiations will be marked by good will, without tactical delays and
playing for time.
Second, as a member of the North
Atlantic Alliance and the European Union we shall seek a new opening in the
relations of the whole West with Ukraine. The democratic breakthrough that
occurred in that country has met with the understanding and support of all
responsible political forces in Poland. We shall do everything to ensure
that this breakthrough gains the appreciation and recognition of the
community of the democratic states of the West. After all, it is an event of
historic proportions, comparable to the European “Autumn of the Nations” in
1989. The reforms in Ukraine require support, and
its shift towards the Euro-Atlantic structures – reciprocation. Acting
bilaterally, we wish to extend the essential assistance to the new president
and government of Ukraine, and to share our experiences in developing and
consolidating democratic and pro-European transformation. In particular, we
shall seek to it that the European Union raises its relations with Ukraine
to the level of Strategic Partnership and opens the
prospect of integration, while advocating NATO offer of a Membership Action
Program.
Third, we shall foster the privileged
character of our relations with the United States. A president friendly to
the Polish cause will stay in the White House for another four years. The
government realizes that the special character of the Polish-American
political relations has not been fully translated to all other areas of
relations. There has been an improvement on economic issues and military
cooperation - and we intend to maintain this trend. But things are not as
good when it comes to the waiver of visas for Poles traveling to the United
States. It would be irresponsible to promise a rapid breakthrough on this
issue. We shall do everything to accelerate the momentum of changes that
would meet the expectations of Polish society. As a new member of the
European Union and a tested ally of America, we shall strive over the coming
weeks and months to revive the spirit of the Transatlantic community, and to
erase the memory of the grievances that hindered cooperation on both sides
of the Atlantic over the last two years.
Fourth, after the elections in Iraq,
we intend to elaborate - with the new government of that state and our
allies in the stabilization coalition – a new formula of Polish engagement
in Iraq. The elections in Iraq are an
indispensable element of normalization, even if the conditions for holding
them will not be perfect everywhere. Still, I am confident that they will
bring positive changes. They will enhance the legitimacy and authority of
the government, cooperation with Iraq’s neighbors
will improve, and the internal security structures will be able to assume
greater responsibility for the situation in that state. The present Polish
Military Contingent will be reduced. The relevant decisions that have been
taken will not undermine our capacity to fulfill our tasks. We intend to
make further reductions, at the same time facilitating the assumption of
responsibility for the security of Iraq – by the
Iraqis. But neither we nor anybody else should harbor any illusions:
normalization of the situation in Iraq will take
years and will require active support by the international community. For
many reasons, Poland should not shirk
participation in that joint endeavor, though our contribution may take
different forms. Our presence in Iraq is likely to
be of an increasingly civilian – rather than military – nature.
Increasingly, it will be Polish companies – rather than troops – that will
facilitate the stabilization of Iraq.
Fifth, our priorities include seeking
jointly with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany a
future-oriented formula of relations between our states – a formula, that
would finally put a closure to the burdens of the past and open
qualitatively new prospects for the development of relations between Poland
and Germany. In recent months we have managed to realise
some significant achievements. Let me recall that the German Chancellor has
unambiguously declared a lack of support of the German government for
individual property claims that could be made by citizens of the Federal
Republic of Germany. The newly-appointed plenipotentiaries of the foreign
ministers of Poland and Germany
for bilateral cooperation, have initiated their activity.
We must take a sober view – free of illusion – of the problems in relations
between our states. Such matters are not resolved by a single act, or some
magic formula. It is a process. The Polish government is under an obligation
to care for the interests of the Polish state and its citizens, mindful not
only of the coming months or years, but of future generations – with an
awareness of the historic perspective of that task. We shall strive to
secure Polish interests, cooperating constructively, in the spirit of
European partnership, with the government of Germany.
Sixth, the government shall spare no
effort to ensure that Poland as host and organizer
of the III Summit of the Council of Europe - an organization that has
integrated democratic states of our continent for over fifty years -
performs that role well. Let me remind you that the Summit
meeting will take place in Warsaw
in May of this year. It is our ambition that the Warsaw
summit should elaborate the future tasks of that
important European institution, becoming an opportunity for deep reflection
on the state of the architecture of security and cooperation in Europe, and
in Euro-Atlantic relations. Also, we would like the Polish presidency of
the Visegrad Group to revive the sense of joint action, primarily in the
framework of the European Union. Finally, we want to leave a good
impression of the Polish presidency of the Council of Baltic Sea States. We
shall also continue our active involvement in the work on the reform of the
United Nations, presenting our vision of a New Political Act of that
organization in the 21st century.
Seventh, we want the coming months to
change the way we think about Poland’s
possibilities of action in areas out-of-Europe. The government issued a
political signal for such an approach with the adoption last November of a
comprehensive strategy addressed at the developing countries. We would like
to see the adoption and implementation of a Law on cooperation for
development, and the creation of the appropriate organizational structures.
Eighth, Polish foreign policy has the
task of attaining objectives serving the Polish economy and Polish
companies. The economic transformations, privatisation and significant
liberalization of trade require corresponding changes in the structures of
Poland’s foreign representation. That means
continued integration of the resources and instruments of foreign policy in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the diplomatic missions. That goal
should also be served by the launching of the planned Polish Agency for
Economic Promotion. The economization of Polish policy – despite
considerable departmental resistance – is necessary and requires substantial
acceleration in 2005, in view of Poland’s
participation in the common commercial policy of the EU and the need to
shape the EU policies in the interest of the Polish economy.
Honorable Members,
The challenges that Polish foreign
policy has had to face in recent months, have caused - apparently for the
first time - divisions on our political scene. Oftentimes, this Chamber has
witnessed heated disputes over such issues as the Constitutional Treaty for
Europe, or the Polish presence in Iraq. This indicates, first and foremost,
that the development of the international situation poses questions that
often do not have one simple and easy answer. However, I do not share a
commonplace view that this is supposed to mean the end of national consensus
over the main themes and tasks of Polish foreign policy. That claim has been
refuted by the conduct of the Polish people and unity of action of Polish
politicians over Ukraine. That issue confirmed the truth that when we speak
with one voice – we are effective in pursuing our national interests. It
would be harmful for our common interests if the fundamental issues of
Polish foreign policy were to become entangled in short-term electoral
calculations.
It is my ambition to ensure the
continuity of all the processes that serve Poland
well and were launched by my predecessors. The new political alignment and
the new government are likely put their own imprint on foreign policy.
However, the issues of fundamental importance to Poland, to its security,
should be continued. For this to happen, it is essential to hold a thorough
debate on questions that are of fundamental significance to Poland
and its foreign policy. Hence, it is necessary to recall
some elementary concepts and issues, axioms of sort, to refresh the way they
are understood. I believe this debate will mark a substantial contribution
to this process.
Members of the House,
On 1st May 2004
Poland became a member of the
European Union. It is too early to make a full evaluation of that historic
event. Still, one thing is beyond dispute: our entry into the Union
has conclusively discredited many false predictions,
fears and concerns that were prevalent in Poland
and abroad.
It has turned out that the accession
of Poland and nine other states did not undermine
the political cohesion of the European Union. Poland
did not become – as had been claimed – a “Trojan horse”,
and we did not need to be taught on how to be good Europeans. The events in
Ukraine demonstrated something quite contrary:
that there are situations in which it is worthwhile to listen to Poland
very closely and that Poland’s
actions enhance the prestige of all Europe.
Members of the House,
Our membership in the European Union
has become a tangible stimulus of Poland’s
development. We have received the first EU funds and more importantly – are
making good use of them. No one has lost on our entry into the EU. Everyone
has benefited. The best example of that is the improved situation of our
farmers - the social group on behalf of which most concerns were expressed
in connection with Poland’s EU membership. Our
national identity has not been undermined. We still live in our own country,
though now it is modernizing faster. There is a natural and quite pronounced
need for a frank public debate on the vision of Europe
that we desire and our place in it. This is so, because
the next few months will bring intensive discussions in all the member
states on the vision of Europe, its future development, its boundaries and
identity in a globalized world. An inspiration or a catalyst to launch such
a debate has been the process of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty,
discussion on the New Financial Perspective, the question of Turkey’s future
membership, and - what is also, or even more significant from the Polish
point of view – an elaboration of concrete conditions and a date for
opening of the accession negotiations with Ukraine.
Our agenda today not only includes the issue
of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, but also ways of boosting
public support for our membership in the EU. Ahead of us is the debate
preceding the constitutional referendum. The sovereign decision we take will
not only have crucial impact on the future development and shape of the
European Union. It will constitute a kind of test of Polish aspirations.
Members of the House,
The Constitutional Treaty signed last
year is more of a conclusion, systematization and rearrangement of earlier
decisions, than a road map to the future. However, rejection of the Treaty
by Poland would doom our country to
self-isolation, and at best – to revival of the idea of a Europe
of “two speeds”, or a Europe of
a “hard core” and a periphery. The greatest weakness of the Treaty is its
language; a search for a compromise formula is often expressed in a
bureaucratic jargon, a lingo of civil servants addressing other civil
servants. Treaties written by representatives of 25 states are rarely
simple, clear and legible. However, it is a Treaty that despite all its
flaws – rooted in its compromise nature – duly takes into account Polish
interests.
At the same time, it is the point of
departure for defining our vision of Europe’s
future. We speak of a Europe that is in solidarity
as well as cohesive, efficient and effective. For that reason,
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy will be of key importance to Poland
– today and tomorrow. It is a project that provides for
strengthening Europe’s competitiveness in the
process of globalization, first and foremost, through investment in
knowledge, new technologies and innovative technical, economic and
organizational solutions.
It is in the Polish interest for the
European Union to be an important subject of international relations,
partner-like in political relations and competitive on the global economic
scene. The rivalry on the global stage is on the rise. It poses a strategic
challenge to all the European states, including the largest ones. It is ever
more difficult for them to compete on their own against such powers as the
United States, or China or India, both growing in
strength. Only as one can Europe face the new
reality effectively. The casting of Europe in a
strategic dimension is in accordance with the Polish national interests.
From that perspective, further enlargement of the EU eastward is to the
advantage of Poland and the European Union as a
whole.
Our membership in the European Union has
shifted the focus of our diplomatic activity. Increasingly, the most
important objective is to promote our interests and win the support of EU
partners for our goals. We have demonstrated that we can be tough
campaigners in pursuit of our goals, without losing sight of the interests
of the entire EU. We have not let any one put us in the corner, nor have we
sunk into self-isolation. We neither want to – not should we – move on the
margins, or only use the brake, or focus on damage control. The brakeman can
only reduce the speed of the joint journey, but he certainly has no
influence on its direction. We want to be, and are, an active subject of EU
policy, with growing influence of the shape of Union decisions.
Members of the House,
A key question is on the agenda – and
it merits serious discussion: with whom and in what way do we want to pursue
our interests inside the European Union? Our strategy envisages three basic
areas of contacts. First, we cultivate close contacts and collaboration with
our strategic partners, mainly Germany and France,
and also Great Britain – with which we share the
same appreciation of the significance of the Transatlantic relations.
Second, we nurture close ties with the states of our region, particularly
members of the Visegrad Group. And finally, third – we seek good relations
and cooperation with all Union partners, with whom we share interests on
specific issues. In other words, we are not inclined to creating durable
coalitions within the EU, but define our position on a specific matter and
look for allies, whose approach is similar or close to our position. We
firmly and unequivocally reject the concept of a “European Directorate” or a
“hard core” of Europe. And any way, there is no tendency today to revive
those concepts. The spirit of European cooperation is good.
Members of the House,
Our membership in the European Union
has induced us to examine our bilateral relations in a new light. This
applies in particular to our main European partners – Germany, France, and
also Great Britain.
The relations with Germany
were in recent months and years the subject of many,
occasionally emotional debates – usually in reaction to the activity of
various political circles in Germany. It is understandable that
Polish-German relations – also today, after the enlargement of the European
Union – have significance that transcends bilateral relations, with a
dimension that is not only historic and determined by the past. To optimize
our policy, we need to answer the following question: how do these
relations impact the implementation of our – that is Polish and German –
broader aspirations, both in the context of the whole Europe, and in the
Transatlantic dimension. From the Polish point of view, those relations can
and should be an instrument and a key lever of our role in Europe. We would
like to build a new model of Polish-German relations that would be firmly
rooted in the European and Transatlantic context. Close cooperation of
Poland and Germany is
particularly needed to dynamise the policies of Western and Euro-Atlantic
institutions addressed to our neighbours in the East, that is Eastern
Europe. A joint Polish-German document, which ministers Włodzimierz
Cimoszewicz and Joschka Fischer presented in Luxemburg last year, could
become the foundation of new EU policy toward Ukraine. Other areas of
Polish-German cooperation include the future of the Transatlantic relations,
and also the political and defense identity of Europe.
This cooperation must be based on
respect for the equality of the partners. We recognize the role of Germany
in the European construction; we hope that on the other
side of the Oder River, too, the negative
stereotypes of Poland – also in social perception
- will be replaced with an image of a friendly and helpful neighbour. Such a
future-oriented model will not become the basis of policy unless past
problems – which are again introducing elements of distrust, uncertainty
and destabilization into Polish-German relations - are closed once and for
all. Our relations require explicit declarations and clear decisions by all
the main political forces and parties in Germany. The future of the
relations between our peoples must not be determined by those who are
forever stranded in the past. We believe in the power of our arguments. They
are historically justified and have a strong legal basis. We should discard
complexes and not be guided by emotions in our policy toward Germany. Our
position meets with understanding and a will for cooperation on the part of
the Federal President, Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,
The year 2005 marks the 60th
anniversary of the end of World War II. For us, it also means the 60th
anniversary of the return of the Western
Territories to the Homeland. We have gained
sufficient distance and historic perspective to reflect deeply on the
responsibility for the war, its consequences and its presence in the
contemporary awareness of states and societies. It is the Polish role to
safeguard the historic truth, to resist its distortion and falsification.
Allow me, Mister Speaker, to make a
short digression at this point. I believe the time is ripe, 60 years after
the end of the war, for the elementary truth about what really happened in
occupied Poland to come to the awareness of the representatives of the media
in the community of the democratic states – in Europe, the United States and
Canada– about who was the aggressor, the occupier, who built the death camps
and murdered people there, and who was persecuted, subjugated and
subjected to the German, Nazi policy of extermination. It was in Polish
territories that the Germans created the largest camps of annihilation,
where – alongside the Jewish people – Poles and members of other European
nations were murdered on a mass scale. A few days from now, on 27th
January – marking the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the
Nazi camp of Auschwitz –Birkenau - the leaders of
almost 40 nations will come to attend ceremonies in remembrance of those
murdered at the site of that death camp. Today, a few days before the
ceremonies that will focus the attention of the whole world, I call on
representatives of press organizations, the Association of Polish
Journalists and other organizations representing the Polish media, to
address – independently of the appeals, corrections and diplomatic
representations of the Polish MFA - a letter to their colleagues, and
partner organizations of journalists around the world , telling them that
the thoughtless or intentional use of the term “Polish death camps” is
insulting and shameful. It not only conceals the truth about the
perpetrators of that crime, but slanders our nation, which was the first
victim of the criminal practices of Nazi Germany.
Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,
Our relations with France. I do not
have to explain what a crucial role in building the European identity has
been played by that country. France is a leading
foreign investor in Poland. That creates a favorable basis for further
development of an enhanced partnership. The climate of our mutual relations
has improved perceptibly. The best illustration of this was the recent visit
to Poland by the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Michel Barnier. Let me put this succinctly: our mutual intentions
concerning the future of Europe are much closer
than is being presented in the press, commentaries and political debate.
The question occasionally appears
whether the Weimar Triangle has not exhausted its political potential. The
answer is simple: institutions of this kind have proved themselves and
constitute a useful platform of political cooperation and discussion on
European problems. We shall particularly count on an active role of France
in the development of the EU’s relations with our Eastern
neighbours.
We put high value on our partnership
with Great Britain. We are linked by a community of views on many European
and global issues. In the recent period, the British government has been
active and imaginative in co-shaping the mechanisms of European cooperation,
particularly including questions of defence policy, security and common
foreign policy. That has made it easier for us, as well, to formulate our
European policy. British policy illustrates the theory that states have
greater impact on shaping the future of Europe
when they take positions on issues of key and central significance – than
when they distance themselves from important issues, relegating themselves
to the periphery of European politics. We hope for tight cooperation with
Great Britain, particularly in creating a modern model of the Transatlantic
relations – relations between America and Europe
– which is of crucial significance to our security.
Members of the House,
The state of the Transatlantic
relations – as all relations between states – is not a value granted once
and for all. Therefore, those relations must be an object of our constant
care and concern. Today, the main issue is to discard any grievances and
prejudices left behind by the differences over the intervention in Iraq. I
note with satisfaction that there is political will on both sides of the
Atlantic to restore a good climate of
collaboration. However, the problem does not boil down to the climate and
atmosphere of the Transatlantic relations. Joint action is the order of the
day.
From the Polish point of view, the new
consensus in the Transatlantic relations should concern two strategically
important areas. First, we are talking about a joint response of the West to
the democratic breakthrough and pro-Western aspirations of Ukraine, and also
about a common political line toward the other partners in the East of
Europe. Second, we need a closer Transatlantic partnership in the so-called
Broader Middle East. That is particularly necessary for reviving the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, assuring international backing for the
normalization of the situation in Iraq, and also to attaining lasting and
comprehensive resolution of the problem of Iran’s
nuclear program. Transatlantic collaboration on all these issues would
guarantee that appropriate ways and means are applied to effectively resolve
these problems. Let me add, that chances for new openings are appearing
with regard to all these issues.
When we speak of the Transatlantic
relations, we should recognize that differences of view on both sides of the
Atlantic are a normal development. However, the
new approach signifies that Europe and the United
States will seek – in a partner-like way – a
common denominator, showing respect for each other’s interests. In the
context of Iraq, it is possible to ascertain – after two years’ experience –
that neither is America capable of getting everything done by itself, nor
is the temptation of playing the role of a “counterbalance” to the United
States a constructive option for some Europeans for succumbing to. At the
same time, we must be ready for a serious debate on the structural model of
the Transatlantic relations. That particularly concerns the role and place
of NATO.
The engagement of the Alliance
in Afghanistan, and also in the training of troops in
Iraq, is an expression of a completely new strategic role of the Alliance.
We have given backing to this new quality, though it is Poland’s
priority to maintain the classic function of the Alliance
as an instrument of collective defence. We support the
selective globalization of NATO’s stabilization activity, because such a
role of the Alliance finds practical use in the
modern world. In the view of the United States, it is the key function of
NATO as a global force. That is so, because Europe
is no longer perceived in America as a potential
target of armed aggression on a mass scale, requiring American protection
and guarantees, but as a partner of the United States
in confronting global threats. NATO must be an
instrument of such global partnership. Otherwise, it will wither away, and
the interest of the United States in the Alliance
will become problematic. That, in turn, would herald the
beginning of the end of America’s presence in
Europe.
I do not have to add that Poland
should be – and is – interested in maintaining the
presence of the United States in Europe
and its role as a peculiar European power. For, the
presence of America in Europe
introduces an unquestionable value added. That manifests
itself, first and foremost, in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus
and Central Asia.
We, in Poland, are aware that our
close – even privileged – relations with the United States
are not an alternative to our engagement in European
integration. We ask ourselves this question: how can we take advantage our
particularly close relations with the United States
to improve the Atlantic relations overall? Our commitment
to improving the Transatlantic relations will not be credible unless it is
coupled with an equally strong commitment to the development of European
cooperation.
The prestige of Poland
in Washington is today higher
than at any time in the past. This prestige is our new asset and a
priceless value, even if it is a value that cannot be measured. Let us be
frank: other countries spend years striving to have such relations though
without success. The kind of position that we have in the United States
is not gained through lobbying. That prestige has gained
in significance since our entry into the European Union. Our relations with
the United States are important primarily because
only America is in position to extend security
guarantees to Poland – in their most credible
version. This factor must not be underestimated even in the present
situation, when the horizon is fortunately clear of any threats to our
security.
Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,
The triumph of democracy in Ukraine,
attained by peaceful means, is a great achievement of millions of
Ukrainians. It is also our Polish success. The mediation of President
Aleksander Kwaśniewski - who won the support of European Union
representatives for the cause, the engagement of numerous Polish
politicians, the activity of Polish parliamentarians above party lines, the
involvement of Polish Euro-deputies and thousands of young election
observers – these and other actions contributed to an auspicious resolution
of the crisis, and constitute an important investment for the future. The
mass solidarity of Poles with democratic Ukraine
is a good point of departure for a breakthrough in the relations between
our societies. Relations at presidential levels are important, but it is the
people who will determine the future of our states. In the recent weeks and
months, the Ukrainians and Poles have shown utmost political maturity and
proper understanding of the raison d’état. And because of that, we shall
spare no effort to create solid and at the same time practical foundations
for the development of mutual relations at the level of societies, so that
the change is tangible for millions of the citizens of our states on both
sides of the border.
I wish to express the conviction that
Ukraine and all Eastern Europe
have permanently returned to the agenda of important
issues that occupy European and Transatlantic institutions. We must
translate this into a positive revaluation of the present policies of the
West toward our neighbours, and in particular – to elaborate a realistic and
substantial “opening package” for the reformist team in Kiev. The myth that
our Eastern neighbours were incapable of meeting Western standards of
democracy and human rights has been debunked. Also, the theory has been
challenged that the nations in that part of Europe
belonged to the sphere of another civilization and culture, to another “zone
of influence”. Finally, the myth has been invalidated that the societies in
that part of Europe were mired in apathy, and were
incapable of building a civil society on their own. The earlier events in
Georgia, and the orange revolution in Ukraine, have forced politicians to
reassess their views and opinions based on prejudices and stereotypes.
Members of the House,
The state of affairs in Belarus
– with which we share a common border - causes
understandable concern in Poland. We support the democratic and pro-European
aspirations of that country’s society. Together with our European and
Transatlantic partners, we are trying to co-shape the policy of the West in
such a way so as to ensure full solidarity with the democratic and freedom
tendencies in Belarus. We are not forgetting about Moldova, either, and the
need for a greater engagement of the West in solving the conflict in
Transdniestria.
Members of the House,
Relations with the Russian Federation
are of key importance to Polish foreign policy. Let us
make this clear: our involvement in what happened in Ukraine
was not directed against Russia. Our engagement was
motivated by support for fundamental values – and not by a play of
interests. It was important for us to make sure that the sovereign will of
the people was expressed in Ukraine. No foreign plot was involved. In fact,
we deeply believe that what happened in Ukraine is
in the interest of Russia. Never in its history, had Russia
as many supportive and friendly states on its Western
border as it does today. We would like Russia to
have the closest and strongest possible ties with Europe, the North Atlantic
Alliance and the European Union. I have in mind not only - and not
primarily - ties in the form of networks of oil and gas pipelines, though
such links are very important. However, as concerns Poland
and Europe – it is the common
standards of democracy, freedom of the press and human rights that are the
most important factors of consolidation and security, at the same time
constituting a common denominator. A stable, prosperous and democratic
Russia will be a much more important center of
influence in the whole post-Soviet space than if it followed a policy based
on anachronistic concepts of the so-called multipolar “zones of
influence”. Furthermore, Russia’s relations with
the democratic Western institutions should not be a zero-sum game either.
The modernization of Eastern Europe and the
prospective integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and also Belarus, with
Euro-Atlantic and European institutions is in the common interest of a
democratic Russia and the West.
For Poland, our membership in the
European Union also offers an opportunity to build a new platform of
bilateral relations with Russia. We shall spare no effort to make progress
in resolving many outstanding problems. A certain experienced Finnish
politician advised that one should seek enemies who are far away, and
friends who are near. It would be desirable if our two countries were
guided by that in their mutual relations.
Members of the House,
A new challenge for Poland
is our participation in the joint discussion on a new
vision of relations in our immediate region after the enlargement of the
European Union. Accordingly, it would also be worthwhile in our internal
debate to consider the place and role of regional policy within the overall
tasks of foreign policy.
Cooperation in the framework of the
Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative and the Council of Baltic
Sea States has enhanced the identity of Central Europe
and ensured stability in the whole region. After our
accession to the European Union, but even 2 or 3 years before its
enlargement, some of our partners expressed doubts as to the point of
preserving the sub-regional structures. Our view on this matter is
different. What is more, we have managed to use concrete initiatives -
including those connected with our current presidency of the Visegrad Group
– to define the needed direction of the evolution of cooperation in the
region, so that its desirability and usefulness is convincingly manifested.
This also concern to the Regional Partnership launched in 2001 – which
affiliates the states of the Visegrad Group, as well as Austria
and Slovenia. Our partners have had an opportunity to
become convinced that Poland does not treat the
region as a base for its political ambitions at the EU forum. Nor do we make
pretensions to playing the role of a regional leader. We have other goals:
we want to use our prestige and position in the European and Transatlantic
family to promote the interests of the region.
The enlargement of the European Union and
NATO, the total change of the geopolitical picture of Europe, and also the
emergence of new challenges, has altered the context of action of the whole
institutional construction in Europe – and not only of the sub-regional
links. These institutions must determine a new sense for their existence.
That, too, is a task for our policy.
Members of the House,
We would like the May summit meeting
of the states of the Council of Europe in Warsaw
to generate a specific vision of the future and place of that organization
in the context of other European structures. The point is to ensure that the
visions being elaborated by the respective institutions, such as the Council
of Europe or the OSCE, are coherent visions. For, those institutions require
total reconstruction. It is especially important to eliminate the overlap
and duplication of actions, as well as institutional rivalry. We should
counteract the tendency of the respective organizations to focus on their
own internal problems. And let us not delude ourselves that one-off
solutions or miracle cures are possible.
At the turn of January, Warsaw
will host another session of the Warsaw Reflection Group,
which affiliates distinguished analysts and researchers from Europe
and North America. It will have the task of preparing a
report on the complementarity of the European structures. It is most
important not to lose any of the normative, political and operational
achievements of the institutions functioning in Europe. The matter is
urgent. It is the case, because the last OSCE Ministerial Council in Sofia
demonstrated how the natural identity crisis of that
organization may be exploited for the pursuit of particularistic political
goals. This is how we perceive the attempts to restrict the activity of that
organization in the human dimension. Such an approach is short-sighted and
may lead to effects that are opposite to what was intended. For our part,
we are considering a constructive, joint search for new solutions. The
appearance of new challenges and asymmetrical threats, such as international
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and new phenomena,
such as failing or failed states, highlights the need for a redefinition of
the global international order. In shaping Polish foreign policy, we act on
the assumption that effective multilateralism is the key to ensuring world
peace and stability. We shall make every effort to preserve and strengthen
the multilateral institutions of global management, particularly the United
Nations.
In this context, reform of the UN is the
most urgent matter. In autumn of 2002 the Polish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, pointed out the need to restructure the
UN. At that time, he put forward the initiative of elaborating a New
Political Act for the United Nations for the 21st century.
Changes were necessitated by the fact that while the system of world
security is dynamic, the structures remain static. In effect, that leads –
first of all – to a conceptual inadequacy of the organization. The UN often
lacks the means to counteract new types of threats and resolve new
problems. The issue is that for many years now the major conflicts have
been emerging inside states, rather than in the relations between them. On
the one hand, the international community usually expects the UN to
intervene quickly and effectively, and on the other – the Organization does
not possess suitable norms, procedures and instruments.
Secondly, it is a case of political
inadequacy, which means that the alignment of forces inside of the
organization does not reflect the actual balance of power in the world.
Thirdly, there is institutional inadequacy, which causes United Nations
bodies and officials to work in an ineffective and outdated way.
The Polish initiative, therefore, was a
comprehensive vision of UN reform. We proposed that a draft of the changes
be prepared by a Group of Independent Personalities. As known, the Secretary
General established such a group over a year ago and it presented its report
last December. The year 2005 will test the capacity of the United Nations,
and especially its member states, to take action for reform. The scheduled
high-level meeting on the anniversary of the Millennium Declaration should
bring political consensus on the package of changes. The question is: Will
it deliver? The question remains open. There is no simple answer.
In its commitment to changing the UN,
Poland does not pursue any hidden goals. We are
not demanding a permanent seat on the Security Council, we are not
advocating institutional change. We are acting on the assumption that first,
you have to identify the problems, define a new mandate of the Organization
– and only then deliberate on the institutional changes. Our approach is
guided by the interests of the international community; we are moving beyond
regional parochialism. Our initiatives primarily comprise an intellectual
contribution; it is an attempt at innovative, creative thinking.
Members of the House,
A serious domestic debate should be
devoted to the future profile of Poland’s
political, military and economic engagement in a global set of relations. I
am referring to Poland as a state that – through
its accession to the European Union – has entered a new system of
international relationships, of which the Union is
a collective subject. Stanisław Wyspiański wrote with a sense of irony in
“The Wedding”: “The whole damn world can take up arms, provided Poland’s
countryside remains at peace with no alarms”. That is not and must not be
the motto of Polish foreign policy in our times. Security has become truly
indivisible, and threats to our national security may originate in exotic
and highly remote regions. Therefore, it is the imperative of Polish foreign
policy to seek national security in the framework of international security,
in cooperation with other states. Our role in Iraq
should be examined from precisely that point of view.
The problem is that the demand for
such difficult and costly roles to be played by NATO and European Union is
not likely to diminish. NATO is militarily engaged in Afghanistan
and expects that Poland, among others, will also make
active contribution. The European Union is establishing battle groups. The
humanitarian disaster in South-East Asia points to
the need for remodeling the concept of such groups, so that they will be
able to deliver effective international relief in such crisis situations.
The situation in Sudan also indicates the need for
such actions. Therefore, we face the need of drafting a sensible doctrine of
international engagement of our military forces in similar operations. We
are talking mainly about humanitarian interventions. That kind of Polish
involvement will require broad public understanding.
Until now, the obvious though
relatively recent postulate that we should transform ourselves from a
country that was helped by others into a country helping those in greater
need, could have sounded as an empty, abstract declaration. The tragedy in
Asia has demonstrated how important it is for
Poland to join relief efforts and show solidarity.
Helping those who are weaker, poorer, afflicted by disease, hunger and
disasters should henceforth change our sensitivity and awareness, but it
also should have its organizational and financial dimension.
Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,
Poland’s
entry into the EU structures and policies necessitates a reassessment of our
relations with non-European states and a redefinition of our place in the
global system. Europe is increasingly perceived
as an entity. We should be influencing the shape of the EU policy toward the
non-European regions. We have certain advantages: we have never been a
colonial state, we have a developed network of missions, numerous
communities of Polish expatriates, as well as a large pool of experts and
researchers. Our greatest weakness and restriction are the modest resources
at our disposal. You cannot pursue an active policy without adequate funds.
The government’s recently-adopted
strategy toward the non-European developing states is a signal of political
will, and of the need for action. It is an important signal, since it is of
a concrete and systematized character. This strategy goes beyond general
declarations. It is a task for years to come. The rank, significance and
attractiveness of such partners as China, India, Pakistan, Malaysia,
Thailand, Indonesia, some Arab states, the RSA, Nigeria, Angola, Brazil,
Argentina, Chile, Mexico and many others, will
continue to rise. In order to take advantage of the opportunities provided
by Poland’s participation in global processes, we
must consistently modernize our system of management of foreign policy
instruments.
Members of the House,
The fact that many Poles, people with
Polish roots live abroad is part of our national identity. Over the past
years, we have built a comprehensive government strategy of cooperation with
expatriate Polish communities. There is a proven mechanism for the
realization of that policy. Some issues here deserve special attention.
That particularly applies to the assistance for Poles in the East, who often
find themselves in a difficult material situation. That applies to the
implementation of the Polish minority postulates in Lithuania. That also
applies to the possibility of self-fulfillment of the cultural identity by
Poles in Germany. I wish to take this opportunity to express my
appreciation and thanks to both houses of parliament for their help,
assistance and active work with the Polish expatriate communities.
Mister President,
Mister Premier,
Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,
The balance sheet of foreign policy in
recent years has been impressive. The accession to the European Union
crowned many years of efforts and opened a new chapter in the history of our
state. We have built a strong position in the Transatlantic relationship,
and high prestige in Europe. The changes in Ukraine
have opened new opportunities for our policy in the East.
We have started actively moving into areas outside of Europe.
The international environment in which we
operate is exceptionally unpredictable and unstable. The situation is prone
to dynamic changes. That sharpens the dilemmas we face and complicates the
search for the right responses.
I have attempted today to focus the
attention of the Members of the House on these fundamental dilemmas, tasks
and priorities. Many states face similar challenges. And in today’s world,
the only effective response to most international problems is a collective
response.
In conclusion, allow me to repeat my
conviction that the effectiveness of our foreign policy is largely
determined by the following elements: continuity and consistency, and also
recognition of the national interest above party lines – which is reflected
by the joint or convergent positions of the main political forces on the
goals and tasks of foreign policy of fundamental significance to the state
and nation.
Thank you for your attention.
