Exposse on the Polish Foreign Policy By Bronislaw Geremek The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Presented to the Plenary Session of the Sejm On the 8th of April, 1999 Mr President, Mr Speaker, Prime Minister, Honourable Deputies, On 12 March Poland joined NATO. The aim spelt out years ago by the governments which had grown out of the Solidarity movement was achieved through the effort of all of the country's political forces and of the entire nation. We stepped into a new epoch of national security. Today Poland constitutes an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic community of democratic states. I beg your leave to express my gratitude to all those who had contributed to Poland's success. Honourable Deputies, Strengthening our state's security through active participation in the North Atlantic Alliance, stepping up the efforts to bring nearer to us the date of our membership of the European Union, raising the level of our activity in the region and interlocking tighter our political and diplomatic endeavours with the pursuit of economic objectives - these are the principal Polish foreign policy goals for 1999. The immensity of challenges thrown up by the next priority target set for Poland's international strategy, now becoming an overriding objective, namely, the membership of and integration into the European Union - calls for an intensification of efforts in this field of endeavour. The efficacy of the accession negotiations will be conditional on the pace of the country's adjustment to EU standards and its ability to address the growing international competition. The consistent implementation of reforms serving the modernisation of the country's key economic and social structures and helping sustain the policy of growth is of crucial importance for the negotiations' success. We are not isolated in our opinion that Poland has been scoring successes on the international scene. These successes have been built on the country's fruitful political and economic transformation. Poland's geographic and political position in Europe and its historical experience explain Poland's concern with and readiness to share responsibility for the situation in the region. We have been helping to generate, to the best of our ability, the conditions of secure development for our eastern and southern neighbours. That is why Poland will be striving, also with its own interest in mind, to surmount all divisions and sweep away all barriers and differences handed down to us by the cold war and forming the legacy of the communist past. All the nations of central and Eastern Europe should be given a chance to undo their developmental arrears and join when it is feasible for them the structures created by the Euro-Atlantic democracies. As Jan Strzelecki once put it: "We knew what brotherhood was all about". Today, in this hour of quiet national contentment, we say: "We know what brotherhood and solidarity are all about." As international security and the regional situation settle into stability, and Poland's international position improves, our foreign and economic policies must search for more ambitious goals and wider geographic horizons. Aware of our needs and possibilities we must expand contacts with states in other regions and share with them responsibility for solving global problems and for the shape of an emerging new international order. Honourable Deputies, The year 1999 will witness the consolidation of our international political gains on the one hand, and on the other our dedicated pursuit of advantageous solutions, some of the latter admittedly surrounded with uncertainties. All these factors have to be borne in mind while setting the principal tasks for the year 1999. The accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Alliance is the most important, most advantageous development of this year, pregnant with long-term consequences. Our country has been covered with effective guarantees furnished by its democratic allies. The presence of Poland in the North Atlantic Alliance consolidates the consequences of the seismic change in the geopolitical position of our country, which has taken place since 1989. Seen in a wider, historical perspective, this change amounts to a total rejection of the order thrust upon us by Yalta. However, some important elements of our international environment raise issues of legitimate concern. May I start with dilemmas prompted by the internal reforms of the European Union, by the Union's institutions now undergoing transformation, the introduction of the Euro and, above all, by the EU member states' social problems. While not underrating the importance of these problems, we never lose sight of the fact that the internal reforms of the European Union - which have for a long time now been perceived as necessary - would enhance the Union's ability to receive new member states in its fold. And what we are striving for right now is for the member states to reiterate their political commitment to keep the Union's internal reforms running parallel to the process of its enlargement. We have acknowledged with satisfaction the results of the 25 March Berlin European Council. The Council both defused the crisis which had blown up following the dismissal of the European Commission and delivered a compromise concerning the Agenda 2000 while heralding in no uncertain terms the enlargement of the Union, starting in the year 2002. In Eastern Europe, the possible consequences of the prolonged financial, economic and social crisis in Russia give grounds for concern. The same goes for the political and economic situation in Belarus. We also find troubling the conspicuous absence of progress in the economic transformation processes in Ukraine and certain countries of central and southern Europe. The Balkan crisis continues to destabilise a very important area of Europe. Our reflections on the genesis of the crisis are nourished by Edmund Burke's remark to the effect that what is necessary for evil to triumph is a good man doing nothing. The world economy has slackened its rate of growth and the trend is likely to continue until mid-2000. This has been responsible for Poland's subdued exports to EU markets and for our exports to Russia going into a nosedive. The governments of many countries, this government included, must address the challenge of the growing sensitivity of nations to certain consequences of globalisation processes taking place in finances, trade, the economy and the media. The trends signalled above solely serve to illustrate the growing complexity of the circumstances surrounding both the formulation and pursuit of foreign policy objectives in 1999. Hence the need for the process of foreign policy co-ordination to be overhauled as a pre-condition for efficient and effective action on the international arena. This also highlights the case for interlocking political aims with the implementation of economic tasks and a firmly selective approach to principal policy directions. Honourable Deputies, The 1999-vintage set of Polish foreign policy priorities is the natural continuation of the policy objectives adopted by this government which I had the honour to present to you last year. They have been modified now both to mirror progress registered in the pursuit of our goals and project the need to adjust to changes now taking place in our international environment. The priorities, which I am now about to list, must be perceived as elements interlocked to form a cohesive whole. As I said earlier, our top priority is to have Poland included in the integration system of the European Union. It is, therefore, necessary for us to keep up the momentum of the accession negotiations, to use our best endeavours to keep alive the EU member states' political will to see the Union enlarged, to promote the positive aspects of enlargement in both member states and those aspiring to membership, and to do away with negative stereotypes which keep cropping up all along. Having become a member of NATO, Poland must make sure it gets fully involved in the Alliance's activities. There is a case to be made both for our widest possible participation in political co-operation within the framework of the Alliance and our integration into its military structures pursuant to the accords concluded. Another point is that we must also be active in helping formulate NATO's political and defence strategy while availing ourselves of the Alliance's instruments of co-operation and partnership serving the strengthening of security in central and eastern Europe. We place central importance on upholding the widest possible bilateral relations with countries of strategic consequence for Poland's security and economic interests. I have in mind, first and foremost, the United States, Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. One cannot overrate the importance of injecting new vigour into our policies designed to strengthen Poland's position in the region, to uphold the strategically important role of Ukraine in eastern Europe and to shore up its on-going transformation and democratisation processes. Having in mind development of good-neighbourly relations benefiting Europe as a whole, we wish to maintain the attitude of political openness vis-á-vis the Russian Federation. We shall be trying to intensify our economic, cultural and scientific co-operation with that country. In our pursuit of the country's economic interests, we intend to further stimulate our contacts with selected non-European states. Our traditional dedication to the tasks pursued by international organisations will continue unabated. Poland has resolved to promote actions in support of a world peace resting on the solid foundation of respect for individual and human rights, democratic public order and the rule of law. With this aim in view we shall be making efforts to increase the Polish presence in the administrative structures and decision-making bodies of international organisations. Our participation in initiatives and programmes designed to counter such non-military threats as terrorism, drug trade and other forms of organised crime is a must from the viewpoint of our own security. And last, but not least, we stress the need for a foreign policy benefiting from co-ordinated action of various government departments, serving the country's interests worldwide. Let me now focus on the tasks set for and the assumptions which underlie the pursuit of Polish foreign policy in the priority areas under discussion. Honourable Deputies, The NATO summit scheduled to be held in April in Washington will mark the 50th anniversary of the Alliance. We shall be attending it as a full member of the Organisation. The North Atlantic Alliance has become for Poland the most important forum in which to pursue the paramount objectives of its national security strategy. Membership of the Alliance poses a tough challenge to Polish foreign and national security policy. Quick adjustment to the requirements of political and military presence within NATO is just one pressing task ahead. The attainment of a second goal, namely, assuring Poland and the Polish armed forces a place within the Alliance that would accommodate our aspirations, is conditional on how well we discharge that task. We want and we must gain within the community of our allies a position making it possible for us to de facto co-create the strategy and policies of the Alliance in a manner concordant with our interests, especially in central and eastern Europe. We have the right conditions enabling us to translate, in a matter of several years, our human and economic resources, as well as our crucial strategic location, into a position a state belonging in a group of NATO's most important members. The catalogue of the most important international security-related issues to be dealt with by Polish foreign policy throughout 1999 further includes proper utilisation of our status of associated member of the Western European Union, looking after Poland's interests during CFE Treaty adaptation work, entrenching other non-proliferation and disarmament regimens, as well as participation in OSCE activities. I beg your leave to elaborate on the foregoing topics. Poland's integration into NATO will be conducted in parallel with the consolidation of our position within the Alliance on the political, military and organisational planes. The need for Poland to be active on the Alliance from day one is obvious to anyone who remembers that NATO membership will be one of the most important instruments supportive of the implementation of Poland's foreign policy in areas other than international security as well. Poland's activity within the Alliance should focus on the following: Firstly, we should continue participating in the debate on the final shape of the new NATO Strategic Concept. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministry have for the past year been working together on this matter. Secondly, we should participate in the discussion going on within the Alliance on a number of projects concerning NATO's operational development. Apart from the new Strategic Concept, and a raft of defence strategy-related documents now being updated in the wake of its adoption, the initiatives aimed at enhancing NATO's defence capability, including bolstering its defences against weapons of mass destruction, will be of crucial importance for mapping out the Alliance's developmental directions over the next decade. Wider political implications of the said initiatives, including for Polish foreign policy pursued in other areas, seem extremely important. That is why active participation in this discussion is intensely in our national interest. Thirdly, our continued participation in the activities of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, political and military co-operation within the framework of the Partnership for Peace, as well as development of bilateral and multilateral contacts with our Partners. While working within the framework of the EAPC and PfP it will be necessary to focus our attention and efforts on our key partners. Fourthly, we must commit ourselves to co-operation within the framework of the Permanent NATO-Russia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission. This plus the activities pursued within the framework of both the EACP and PfP should between them help Poland specialise in a range of issues within NATO. On top of that, we shall participate in discussions designed to set in concrete NATO's "open door" policy, supporting countries of our region - our neighbours first and foremost - in their pursuit of their aspirations. Membership of the North Atlantic Alliance has made it formally possible for Poland to seek the status of Associated Member of the Western European Union and, consequently, expand our participation both in honing the Union's politico-military strategy and in its practical operations. We have also taken note of the livening up of the debate on the organisational shape and prospects of the European Defence, which highlights the future of the WEU as a key issue under scrutiny. The said change of our status, therefore, permits us to appraise positions being spelt out and move up closer to the operational structures and mechanisms of the II pillar - the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The year 1999 will be of crucial importance, as it will witness the conclusion of the on-going intense negotiations on adaptation of the CFE Treaty. Poland will endeavour to attain the following objectives: a) To introduce into the adapted Treaty only those provisions which will not hinder the further enlargement of NATO while providing the assurance that Poland is secure in its status of a full member of the Alliance. This is in reference to possible Treaty-imposed limits on permanent or temporary (e.g. emergency) deployment in Poland of Allied conventional armaments. b) To avoid a situation whereby Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary would be subject to additional heavy constraints, which would set us apart from the other members of the Pact. The negotiations we are conducting in this connection are fully in keeping with the provisions of our armed forces' modernisation plan. We expect that the adaptation of the CFE Treaty will take place during the autumn summit of the OSCE in Istanbul. Poland's chairmanship of the OSCE last year coincided with a period of intense conflicts. Poland and the Polish diplomatic service passed the difficult test. In bolstering co-operation between the OSCE and NATO and setting in train co-operation on the ground between these two and other European institutions, the Polish chairmanship blazed new trails for European security policy. It also helped build up Poland's international credentials. Upon the completion of OSCE chairmanship, Poland joined Norway and Austria on the Organisation's "troika". Which means that in addition to its involvement in the work of the trio, Poland has a role to play in the drafting of the Charter on European Security. We also intend to take active part in the implementation of the OSCE "human dimension", in particular in the development of democratic institutions in those OSCE member states with enduring deficits of democracy and deficient monitoring of observance of human rights and OSCE principles. The year 1999 will see a further updating of The Vienna Document '94. The aim of this venture will be to produce a new catalogue of confidence-building measures reflecting the new reality and meeting the requirements of European security. In close co-operation with our NATO allies, and also within the framework of the Weimar Triangle, we shall be trying to ascertain that the updated Vienna Document will contribute to enhancing Poland's security and improving the transparency, stability and predictability of the situation in our closest neighbourhood. We shall also support the development of regional confidence and security-building measures in other areas, the Baltic Sea basin included. We shall also participate in the provisional implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies whose coming into full force and effect, however, hinges upon its prior ratification by Russia and Ukraine. Bearing this in mind, we shall embark upon actions in the capital cities of both countries to induce their relevant authorities to put in place the required ratification procedures. The task of strengthening both Poland's external security and international security calls for a continuation of efforts aimed at both eliminating mass destruction weapons and securing our active involvement in, among other things, the Disarmament Conference debates. Having completed the process of ratification of the nuclear test ban Treaty, Poland now needs legislation to implement the convention banning chemical weapons. I may stress at this point that over the past few years Poland has gained membership of all non-proliferation bodies and organisations. Proper adjustment of Poland's internal laws to international regulations governing exports of military hardware and technology while proceeding with the global promotion of the Polish defence industry is a challenging task in the realm of security policy umbilically linked to the area of external economic relations. Honourable Deputies, Negotiating our membership of the European Union has since our entry into NATO moved to number one spot in the hierarchy of 1999 Polish foreign policy goals. Drafting a Polish outline opinion on the Union's institutional reform will constitute an element of paramount importance for the outcome of this complex process. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has for some time now been working on such an opinion which gives us a chance to even indirectly participate in one of the most momentous debates now going on within the EU. We shall also be trying to secure for Poland a role in a Union debate on its early 21st century tasks, to be foreshadowed by the Millennium Declaration to be adopted by the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999. We are particularly keen on having defined a timetable specifying the enlargement of the Union. In 1999 the Government of the Republic of Poland will produce another annual Information for the European Commission Report concerning progress registered by Poland in preparation for membership of the EU. While taking account of the generally positive assessment of this progress in the 1998 Commission Report, one must nevertheless focus more sharply on its criticism of certain aspects of that progress. Therefore our actions in 1999 concentrate on rapid elimination of the barriers to Poland's integration into EU identified by the Report, to speed up the adjustment process. One must also remember that in 1999 the Treaty on European Union will be evaluated upon the completion of the first five-year period of its operation and procedures necessary to usher in a second stage of the Union's enlargement will be invoked. In 1999 it will also be necessary to complete preparations for reception of PHARE and pre-accession aid which will be made available to us under a new assistance conception. In a word, a success of both our negotiations with the EU and integration-oriented endeavours must be built on the foundation of continued in-depth reforms of the national economy and state structures. It is necessary to consistently attain the basic goals enshrined in the National Programme of Poland's Preparation for Membership of the European Union, to inject more efficiency into the co-ordination of work of diverse agencies of state, inspire effective promotional projects, anticipate flashpoints in relations with the Union and stamp them out quickly should they ever crop up. The hitherto course of the screening operation inspires confidence that it will meet its July 1999 deadline. We shall therefore be trying to be efficient with our accession negotiations. Up till now we have presented our position on sixteen negotiating areas. Poland must submit its negotiating positions on the remaining fifteen areas by the end of the year. It is our intention to close a maximum number of the negotiating chapters before 1999 is out. Pinning our hopes on a friendlier negotiating environment, we shall intensify our bilateral contacts with EU member states. Top-level contacts would be of crucial importance here. It will also be necessary to step up the frequency of contacts with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and Hungary. Regular contacts with the Chief Negotiators will be maintained in keeping with the 5+1 formula. Initiatives will be launched to get Poland involved in broad discussions on matters falling within the scope of I pillar and II pillar, including on strategy addressed to central European states. In our view, wider and more efficient access should be ensured to information on the European Union's internal reform and the implementation of Agenda 2000. Honourable Deputies, While focusing our attention and expending our efforts on membership negotiations with the European Union we must not lose sight of other areas of European co-operation provided by the Council of Europe, the Central European Initiative, the Council of Baltic Sea States, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation or, for that matter, different forms of regional and cross-border co-operation. Availing itself of the opportunity furnished this year by the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Council of Europe, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is about to come forward with a programme designed to popularise the Council's role and record. In 1999 we shall be trying to sign up to the North-South Centre and embrace more conventions of the Council of Europe. We shall also participate in the process of reforming the Council of Europe pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Final Report of the Comité des Sages. Discussion continues on the place and role of the Central European Initiative in the system of European integration groupings. We attach considerable importance to co-operation within the framework of the CEI. In our view, securing adequate resources for the financing of specific projects in the agriculture-food industry, research and scientific co-operation, town and country planning and small and medium-sized business should be the number one task of the Initiative. Co-operation in the Baltic Sea region, including within the framework of the Council of Baltic Sea States is an important and promising direction of Polish foreign policy. The region in question is second to none in Europe as a forum of co-operation of states with differing status in relation to principal European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. It also provides points of contact between Russia and the European Union and NATO. And, last but not least, this region is conspicuous for the presence of both the United States and the European Union, recently highlighted by the initiative launched by Finland to develop the "Northern Dimension of the EU". In 1998 the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined a programme of action addressed, above all, to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This year we intend to further develop this programme to accommodate a wider role of the CBSS. We intend to lend our support first of all to specific forms of Baltic co-operation in such domains as the economy, power industry, ecology, transportation, town and country planning, civic security and youth exchange. The raft of important objectives set before Polish "Baltic policy" further includes pursuit of enhanced stability and predictability of our immediate neighbourhood. Hence our continued readiness to carry on with our supportive involvement in confidence and security-building ventures in the Baltic Sea basin, primarily within the framework of the PfP, the EAPC and the BALTSEA. Our policy of drawing on existing aid programmes to secure the broadest possible involvement of the Baltic States in military co-operation will remain unchanged. At the same time, in our dialogue with Russia we shall continue to strive for a gradual transformation of the Kaliningrad District from its present strategic forward deployment area for military interests into an important regional element of Russia's presence on the Baltic. While enjoying an observer status on the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC), Poland is keenly interested in promoting co-operation between the said grouping and the Council of Baltic Sea States, and also between the BSEC and the Central European Initiative. As flesh is being put on a number of transport infrastructure and gas-and-oil transmissions network projects, now being pursued within the framework of the BSEC, this co-operation can deliver to Poland substantial economic dividends. Operating within the country's new administrative structure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue to co-ordinate the decentralised international co-operation of its voivodships (provinces) and will help build their inter-regional and cross-border presence on the solid foundation of international law. We shall support Polish entities in their co-operation with the EU Committee of the Regions and the Committee of Experts of the Council of Europe for Cross-Border Co-operation. Honourable Deputies, Let me now turn to our bilateral relations and multilateral initiatives, which are of crucial importance for Poland's interests. Let me stress at this point that Poland pronounces itself resolutely in favour of the lasting and credible presence of the United States - a Euro-Atlantic and, indeed, global power - in Europe. In our relations with the United States we shall be pursuing the objective of embedding US interests in Poland and entire central Europe more deeply than has been the case so far. At the same time we are desirous of strengthening the position of Poland as the principal ally of the United States in our region. We are confident that Polish-American co-operation can also provide a positive stimulus to other countries and encourage them to jointly with Poland address complex issues of central and Eastern Europe. This is just one element of the message of the declaration on co-operation in the process of transformation signed by Poland, the United States and Ukraine in the autumn of 1998. And we have noted with satisfaction that Canada has launched a similar initiative: the Canadian Prime Minister's recent visit to Warsaw fully bore that out. Our basic task in the realm of economic relations is to keep encouraging American capital to invest in Poland on the one hand, and to gain a better access to the American market for Poland's agriculture-food and industrial products on the other. We shall be striving to obtain for Polish exporters preferential tariffs under the GSP system. Mindful of the forthcoming decisions concerning the future of the Polish-American Enterprise Fund, one of the very few successful funds of this type now under liquidation, we shall attempt to keep in Poland a considerable part of its capital so that it can now serve and benefit central and eastern Europe. We wish to further develop good contacts with Polish expatriate communities and organisations in the United States. It would be difficult to overrate their role in securing a positive outcome of our strivings for NATO membership. Time now to embark upon close co-operation in such new important fields of endeavour as the economy, culture and science. We also place a high value on both the dialogue now unfolding with Jewish communities in the United States and support the main Jewish organisations mobilised for Poland during the ratification debate in the US Senate. We know full well that in 1999 the Polish-Jewish dialogue will be touching upon some extremely difficult matters requiring of the two sides both good will and understanding. It is precisely this kind of attitude that can be expected of us by our partners. Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany will continue to receive top priority treatment from Polish foreign policy throughout 1999, and that goes for bilateral economic contacts as well. Poland's membership of NATO, the electoral victory of the SPD/Alliance'90/the Greens coalition and the resultant new tones detectable in Germany's European policy, the German chairmanship of the European Union in the first six months of 1999, as well as the coming into force on 1 January of the Economic and Monetary Union - all that adds up to new conditions under which Polish foreign policy pursues its objectives. Numerous top-level Polish-German contacts registered in the wake of the general election in Germany are ample proof of both the success of Polish foreign policy and of the role Poland plays in German politics. Points at issue should not be allowed to cloud the indisputable fact, namely, that with good will predominating on both sides, we have been step by step, by trial and error, generating a Polish-German community of interests within the framework of a wider European integration process. This community of interests forms a good foundation for a further development of bilateral economic co-operation and invigoration of contacts at all levels. Bearing the aforesaid in mind, persuading Germany to intensify its support for Poland's aspirations to EU membership will be the fundamental objective to be pursued by Polish foreign policy in relations with our western neighbour. This task will be served by meetings and consultations scheduled to be held throughout 1999, as well as by closer inter-parliamentary co-operation, the Polish government being particularly keen to get the latter off the ground. We attach growing importance to fine-tuning co-operation between Polish and German government departments and occupational communities, to youth exchange projects, regional contacts including those between border regions, and to partnership schemes set up by municipal and provincial authorities, schools and universities. Mindful of this, in 1999 we shall convene a meeting of prime ministers of the German Länder situated along the German-Polish border. It is our desire to further improve our very good co-operation in combating crime and illegal migration. We wish to take advantage of the declared pragmatism of the present German ruling coalition to resolve some difficult bilateral problems, the most important of them being compensation payments to former concentration camp inmates and slave labourers, financing co-operation of young people, the future of the Foundation of Polish-German Co-operation, provision of services in Germany by Polish citizens on the strength of individual contracts and the question of resetllers. Under the new circumstances provided by our membership of the Alliance, we wish to further strengthen our good political and military co-operation. The Polish-German-Danish corps, its headquarters to be based in Szczecin, will be the first joint unit of three NATO states to be deployed on Polish territory. Within the framework of allied defence planning we shall be pressing for establishment of new forms of co-operation to include Germany and other NATO members. We shall also be focusing out attention on the possibility of co-operation of our defence industries. France - an extremely important element of European equilibrium and stability and an influential member of the European Union - is Poland's well-wishing partner, supportive of our pursuit of our strategic foreign and security policy objectives. In 1999 we shall be trying to place a higher priority on contacts with France in all key areas of our external relations. We wish for France - assisted by vigorous intergovernmental, parliamentary, party political and local-level contacts - to carry on as an advocate of reform and enlargement of the European Union. In our relations with France we shall be aiming at creating attractive conditions for increased French investment in Poland, and at stimulating our mutual trade turnover. We must do our utmost to reduce our trade deficit with France. With our own interests in mind, we shall be analysing more closely and across a wider range of issues, French proposals concerning the European Union's institutional reform. These seem largely convergent with our own preferences. Operating in close and permanent contact with France, we shall also be making our own contribution to the debate on the European Defence and Security Identity within the framework of NATO, and on European Defence. We take appreciative note of both the growing politico-military role of France in Europe and the weight of its modernised military capacity. Our partnership and alliance-inspired co-operation with France and the Federal Republic of Germany has also an extremely important and unique multilateral dimension. Co-operation within the framework of the Weimar Triangle furnishes opportunities for launching initiatives encouraging commitment of these two key EU member states to Poland's integration into European structures, and supplements convincingly our bilateral relations with France and Germany. The Triangle projects a new formula of international relations in the heart of Europe. Its attractiveness consists in its being both the institution with a European dimension, and a forum in which to address European problems. While enabling a dialogue of "both parts of Europe", the Triangle forms a key element serving the establishment of Poland's regional and European position. At the same time the Weimar Triangle can serve as a convenient forum for discussing both the eastern policy of an expanding European Union, and the EU's strategy in relation to Russia, under construction today, and a future strategy vis-á-vis Ukraine. The on-going debate on European security should also become an important element of co-operation within the Weimar Triangle. The list of events scheduled to be held in 1999 within the framework of the Weimar Triangle includes a summit meeting to be attended by the presidents of Poland and France and the German chancellor, as well as the annual meeting of the three countries' foreign and defence ministers. The United Kingdom is Poland's major European partner actively supporting our strivings for integration first into NATO and now into the European Union. One can speak of a strongly accentuated convergence of Polish and British interests in the area of European security. An intensification of the Polish-British dialogue and preserving Poland's position as the United Kingdom's main partner in central Europe - these are the main tasks for Polish diplomacy. We shall be striving for a further development of our military co-operation, for the implementation of the agreement on the availability of Polish military training grounds to the British armed forces while promoting co-operation of army staffs and officer exchange projects. In the economic domain it is necessary to step up our trade exchange, in particular to increase our exports to the UK, and to systematically attract British capital to our country. Our good co-operation in combating organised crime should also be intensified. Italy is one of the most important inward investors in Poland and our major trading partner. That is why keeping up intensive Polish-Italian contacts, including top-level ones, lies in our strategic interest. A month ago we played host in Warsaw to the Italian Prime Minister. However, just as in the case of other EU member states, ways must be found of reining in our soaring trade deficit with Italy and restoring our trade balance with that country. The 20th anniversary of the pontificate of Pope John Paul II and the ratification of the concordat with the Vatican represented an important element serving the strengthening of contacts with the Holy See. The papal pilgrimage to Poland this coming June will be taking place under the new conditions spelt out by the concordat. Its importance and symbolic value call for meticulous co-ordination of the preparatory work of all state institutions concerned. We shall respond with undivided attention to the programme of strengthening peace and human rights contained in the New Year homily of Pope John Paul II. In our bilateral political and economic co-operation with Austria, the Benelux countries, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and the Nordic states we intend to lay particular emphasis on questions related to Poland's integration into the European Union and creating better conditions for our exports. For we are concerned over the persistently high deficit in our trade exchange with Western Europe. Opening up realistic prospects for a solution of this problem and encouraging new capital investment in Poland are the key issues of vital interest to this country. In our initiatives designed to promote our EU membership aspirations we shall be playing up the benefits which will accrue to the citizens and economies of the member states from the enlargement of the Union. This explains the pivotal role played under the circumstances by political and economic contacts at all level. We pin considerable hope on the Netherlands idea of convening a conference at Utrecht, which would aim at tightening Polish-Dutch co-operation with the intention of speeding up the Polish accession negotiations with the European Union. In our contacts with Spain we wish to draw on that country's experience gained while securing its access to the Union's structural and cohesion funds. The year 1999 is the Polish year in Sweden, which should help promote our bilateral economic contacts. We also intend to strengthen our relations with Finland. We are planning to intensify work on the strategically important Via Baltica motorway. In the second half of 1999 Finland will assume chairmanship of the European Union. We intend to embark upon a vigorous dialogue with Helsinki on EU enlargement. We shall also be following closely the further progress of the discussion on the Finnish concept of "Northern Dimension" of the EU. Our policy vis-á-vis the three Baltic States is clearly defined. We intend to further foster our good contacts with Latvia, Estonia and, above all, with Lithuania, Poland's neighbour and privileged partner. We shall keep supporting their security and NATO membership aspirations ("open door" policy) and their contacts with the EU. Honourable Deputies, We want our exceptional involvement with central and Eastern Europe to keep growing. Our co-operation with countries of this region, very much like our relations with Russia and Ukraine, will be of crucial importance for defining Poland's position in Europe. The year 1998 witnessed a renaissance of the Visegrad Group, which we were pleased to acknowledge. In the past years the idea of Visegrad co-operation kept resurfacing in Polish foreign policy. This year, we shall be trying, within the framework of the Visegrad Group, to deepen co-operation among the partner countries by, inter alia, holding consultations on the enlargement of the EU and pursuing co-operation within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance (Slovakia to be active within the PFP and EAPC). A very important task set before the Group is to actively promote Slovakia's candidacy for NATO membership. We wish to build Visegrad co-operation on the firm foundation of specific projects, including those to be deployed in the area of infrastructure, visa and consular policy and in the national economy. Practical achievements of the Visegrad Group will provide a yardstick with which to measure its success. In our relations with the Czech Republic and Hungary we shall be playing up our unique partnership which will find its expression in, inter alia, sustaining mechanisms enabling the holding of consultations on essential aspects of foreign and defence policy. We also intend to support the construction across the territories of our states (including Slovakia and Romania) of communication and transport highways and promote the development of bilateral and multilateral Euro-regional co-operation. In dealing with Hungary we attach importance to expanding the range of activities of the "Carpathians" Euro-region, whereas in our contacts with the Czech Republic we would welcome a greater display of vitality on the part of the Sudeten area. We shall keep foremost in our minds and at the top of our agenda the welfare of the Polish national minority living in the Czech Republic. In our contacts with Slovakia we intend to concentrate on ventures strengthening the hand of democratic and pro-market opinion in that country while supporting Bratislava's NATO and EU membership aspirations. We shall rapidly reintroduce the machinery of bilateral and multilateral consultation to handle issues of international consequence and those related to co-operation within the framework of the Visegrad Group. Sharp differences between political, economic and social stability levels observed in Southeast European countries are largely responsible for the shape of our relations with that area. Conflicts engulfing Bosnia and Herzegovina and the area of Kosovo perniciously affect relations with the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia being the exception. Forging contacts with the latter country will make it possible to complete the belt of stable, democratic states stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea. In our relations with Croatia and Macedonia we shall be supporting their pro-European policy orientation. Poland will continue to support the brittle statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We intend to continue our participation in the peace-keeping forces (SFOR). We are also desirous of contributing to the stability of the state structures of Albania. Poland's position vis-á-vis the steamroller of conflict in the former Yugoslavia is consistent with the principle of shared responsibility for peace and stability in that part of Europe. That is why an improvement of our relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is conditional on Belgrade's commitment to finding a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict. We shall be coming out in favour of shortening Bulgaria and Romania's waiting time for membership of NATO and the European Union. The effectiveness of our support, however, will be contingent on the actual progress of their own domestic economic and social transformations. And it is in this particular area that we intend to offer those countries, our resources permitting, different forms of support. We are following with keen interest the emergence of a concept of co-operation to bring closer together Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, plus initiatives concerning south-central Europe. We attach particular importance to our relations with Greece and Turkey, our allies. Expanding co-operation with Greece is essential for realisation of our EU membership aspirations. In our pursuit of regional security we wish to sustain the intensive dialogue with Athens within the framework of NATO and bilaterally. We shall maintain and expand close contacts and all-round co-operation with Turkey. We wish to nurture the image of Poland as Turkey's principal partner in central Europe. Honourable Deputies, The shaping up, in the decade now drawing to a close, of diplomatic relations with countries of eastern Europe, notably with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, in accordance with the Polish national interest, has been a success of Polish diplomacy. We must consolidate that success. We further wish to open new avenues for our political and economic activities in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Honourable Deputies, The Russian State has now found itself in a difficult situation. This highlights the relevance of our principal policy objective in respect to the Russian federation, which amounts to pursuit of good-neighbourly relations with that country and establishing premises of our European partnership. The idea of starting a dialogue with Russia in a spirit of partnership now stands a chance of gradual implementation. That Poland will be a consistent advocate of such a dialogue will impart exceptional importance and a new dimension in this venture, what with Poland's membership of NATO and the initiated accession negotiations with the European Union. Initiatives of the Russian Federation, on the other hand, should help enhance mutual understanding and trust in the realm of regional security. We do not want to perceive problems dogging our bilateral relations as hurdles on the path of dialogue and co-operation, but as questions to which answers have to be found. The ongoing political dialogue has to be livened up for these ideas to be carried into life. A visit by the Russian Prime Minister to Poland proceeded by the IV Session of the Joint Polish-Russian Commission for Trade and Economic Co-operation must help to bring this about. It is also necessary to strengthen consultation mechanisms serving the two countries' Ministries of Foreign Affairs and to forge closer contacts between their respective government departments responsible for the economy, culture, internal affairs, the police and border guard forces. We shall be trying to see to it that the cross-border movement of people helps reduce the sense of isolation on the Russian side of the border. We intend to be more active in supporting cross-border co-operation and promoting the development of the "Baltic" Euro-region on the Baltic Sea. We shall also seek to resume the dialogue of the political and opinion-forming elites of the two countries. A 1999 initiative to mount a presentation of Russian regions in Poland and actions promoting cross-border co-operation could be employed to good purpose. Development of economic contacts with Russia is an important area of co-operation. However, the range and dynamism of these contacts will be conditional on the results of the economic and regional policies the Russian authorities have adopted to pull their country out of the crisis. It is essential to search for ways of pulling our bilateral trade out of its present-day slump. Ukraine has invariably been Poland's strategic partner in Eastern Europe. This is an axiom of our eastern policy. The intensity and importance of our bilateral relations will now be increasingly contingent on the range and rate of transformation of the Ukrainian economy and political system. The strengthening of the democratic structures of the Ukrainian state, success of the country's economic reform and progress being registered in creating the fabric of a civic society there are all emphatically in our national interest. Therefore launching bilateral and multilateral initiatives to help keep these processes on course is the principal task set for Polish foreign policy in the Ukraine. The Permanent Polish-Ukrainian Conference for European Integration will be a key institution encouraging performance of this task. Its inaugural session was held on 29 March in Warsaw. However, the situation inside Ukraine does not inspire much optimism, and we are saying this openly and with some trepidation. It is necessary to break the impasse, to step over the critical point the process of reforms has reached in that country. The Polish-American-Ukrainian co-operation initiative (PAUCI) which will be developed in 1999 should contribute to this. The existence of a strong and democratic Ukraine is in the interest of Poland, in the interest of the region and, indeed, in the interest of Europe. The content and rank of an official political dialogue between Poland and Belarus will depend on the development of the situation in that country and in particular on its authorities' position vis-r-vis the question of respect for human rights and democratic freedoms. Also of importance will be Minsk's attitude to key international issues: at present this attitude runs counter to our security interests in a number of areas. We do not want to isolate Belarus. Neither do we want to see it sink in a self-imposed isolation. The decision is in Minsk's hands, however. We intend to preserve a possibly wide range of bilateral economic and cultural contacts with Belarus. Polish non-governmental organisations and scientific and cultural institutions and their diverse initiatives have an exceptional role to play in the conduct of Polish policy vis-r-vis Belarus. Poland must open itself to contacts with countries of Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The economic and political advancement of these countries is a fact of life. We wish to lay particular stress on economic contacts with individual countries of both regions. Securing for Poland alternative sources of energy will be one of the aims of co-operation we shall be developing with the said countries. Honourable Deputies, Energising both economic contacts and foreign policy in relation to selected states and regions outside the Euro-Atlantic zone is a precondition for the sustained economic growth of our country. The development of economic co-operation with non-European countries will also fortify Poland's position globally. All our activities in the Middle East and Africa should be conducted with due account taken of the conditions, which must be furnished for Poland's economic interests to be properly taken care of. Trade turnover should grow in association with our efforts to correct our imbalances in trade with the area under discussion. One must remember that in the first decade of the next century countries situated in the Mediterranean Sea basin will to all likelihood gain the distinction of a non-European area most strongly integrated with the European Union. It will therefore be necessary to gradually liberalise our trade with the countries of the area, which have entered into similar agreements with the EU. A visit to the region of the Polish minister of foreign affairs, which is expected to take place later this year, will help Poland invigorate contacts therewith. In our relations with Israel we shall strive for intensification of our political dialogue and to encourage development of economic, cultural and scientific relations between our two countries. We must also tap into the rich vein of historical and civilisational heritage binding together the Polish and the Jewish nations. Our involvement in the peace process in the Middle East and support being given to the Palestinian Autonomy should take into account security interests of the region as a whole. While strengthening our mutually advantageous economic contacts with selected countries of sub-Saharan Africa we should commit ourselves to their aid-led development which will facilitate both our political contacts and economic ventures in the area. Poland's involvement in promoting both human rights and democracy, and participation in multilateral strivings aimed at defusing specific conflict-prone situations should help strengthen our presence in Africa. The year 1999 should galvanise our relations with Asia and the Pacific Ocean region. Developing political dialogue with Asian and Pacific Ocean region countries, also at the highest level, is in Poland's interest. A wide-ranging promotion throughout the said region of the Polish economy, of exports first and foremost, will be our principal task. Growing interest being displayed by Japanese investors in the Polish market calls for focusing our attention on our relations with Japan. There will be a further strengthening of relations with the Republic of Korea, our leading economic partner in the region. The forthcoming visits to that country of our Prime Minister, speaker of the Sejm, the minister of foreign affairs and Polish economic delegations will provide new strong stimuli to our contacts with the Republic of Korea. The political dialogue, as well as economic, cultural, scientific and military co-operation with the Chinese People's Republic will have a serious claim on our attention in 1999. We are expecting a visit to Poland by the minister of foreign affairs of the Chinese People's Republic. In late 1998 some positive signs emerged in the area of economic co-operation, more specifically in our trade exchange, although we are currently at a disadvantage, our imports from that country having swept into a substantial lead over our exports. We wish to sustain the tradition of good atmosphere in our contacts with India. Decisions arrived at during our president's visit to India will be realised amidst our strivings to expand our co-operation in the realms of science, technology and culture. We are planning to sustain our vigorous political and economic contacts with Australia. A visit to that country by the Polish minister of foreign affairs, expected to take place later this year will be essential for development of our bilateral relations and our co-operation within international organisations. Very many of our important economic ventures embarked upon in Latin America require strong political support. Therefore it is necessary to maintain our top-level political contacts especially with Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Chile. We should also get involved in the on-going dialogue between the European Union and Latin America (Mercosur first and foremost). With their complementary economies and political will to develop mutual relations, Poland and Latin American countries have a lot to offer to one another. Honourable Deputies, In 1999 we wish to lay greater emphasis on our participation in the efforts aimed at adjusting the Organisation and the entire United Nations system to new challenges. Initiated in 1997, the process of reform has been unfolding too slowly. Preparations for an Assembly of the Millennium, which will work out decisions concerning the directions and forms of operation of the United Nations on the eve of the 21st Century, furnish an opportunity to surmount that hurdle. We shall be actively joining these endeavours. While helping with the drafting of a reform of the Security Council we shall redouble our efforts to gain one more seat on the Council for a representative of central and Eastern Europe. We are keenly interested in promoting efficient dispute-prevention and conflict-regulation ventures under the aegis of the United Nations. With the Polish Army contingent being the largest national force to be contributed to UN peace-keeping operations, we intend to maintain our involvement at this level. We have been active in streamlining both these and humanitarian operations of the United Nations Organisation which has added to Poland's prestige on the international arena. We are also making plans to continue our involvement in the set of problems surrounding observance of human rights. We attach importance to propagating throughout the UN system of the sustained development concept, which represents a new comprehensive approach, geared to integrating various aspects of economic growth, social development and environmental protection. We place a high value on multilateral negotiations concerning environmental protection. We accord a high priority to our participation in negotiations on a UN international convention on combating organised crime; we submitted our own draft of such a convention in 1996. Work on the convention is now moving into a crucial phase, the document itself ("the Warsaw convention") standing a chance of being adopted by the UN General Assembly Session in the year 2000. Helped by its on-going domestic reforms, a high rate of growth and membership of the OECD and other western institutions, Poland is now moving rapidly on to join the group of advanced nations. This carries specific implications. We must be ready to assume the obligation, within the UN system, to deliver development and humanitarian aid to less developed countries. Therefore we must elaborate our own co-operation and development aid system, and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will carry on with relevant work. Honourable Deputies, Under the less favourable external circumstances which condition our operations, Polish foreign policy should in 1999 more actively support the government's pursuit of its economic priorities; it should focus on strengthening the structural reforms of the Polish economy and sharpening its competitive edge. The list of our principal goals for 1999 includes promotion of the country's economic interests, with particular stress being laid on energising exports and encouraging the inflow of foreign direct investment capital, as well as reinforcing the image of Poland as a country which prides itself on its attractive, stable and competently run economy. We deem it important to support integration of the Polish economy with the global economy, especially with that of the European Union, and take advantage of international co-operation to transform our economy in compliance with OECD, and then with EU standards. Poland's participation in international endeavours aimed at delivering mutually advantageous liberalisation of trade, especially in the efforts manifest in the fora provided by the WTO and CEFTA and, above all, the Millennium Round, should also help define the range and rate of progress of liberalisation of trade in farm products. Both actions and resources earmarked for the implementation of Poland's economic policy should be concentrated on countries and markets of priority importance for our exports and as prospective sources of investment capital. It is essential to ensure the widest possible access to these countries of Polish goods, services and capital and to lend promotional support to Polish economic entities by generating business information enabling them to take on foreign competition on a level playing field. A cohesive and well functioning system of promotion of the Polish economy is our key national interest and foreign policy factor. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy have pooled their forces and resources to create such a system. Spelling out the principles and timetable of creating a new system of task-setting for, and implementation of, the state's external economic policy is another goal set for 1999. This goal is enshrined in the coalition contract concluded by the Solidarity Electoral Action and the Union for Freedom. Honourable Deputies, Poland's membership of NATO and the accession negotiations with the European Union add up to a new reference system for Poland. It is, therefore, necessary for Poland to change both the government-adopted mechanisms of promoting the country's image internationally, and the criteria of financing such activities from public funds. In 1999 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should become the actual co-ordinator of the international promotion of Poland. In our 1999-vintage promotion projects we shall highlight - in addition to the 60th Anniversary of the outbreak of the World War II and the 10th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe - Poland's integration into the European Union, our membership of NATO, the role of Poland in the east-central European region, the Polish economy and investments in Poland, as well as Polish culture and science. In 1999 and beyond, the human and financial resources of government agencies should be committed to the promotion of Poland's integration into the European Union. The level of acceptance of Poland's accession to the European across the range of west European opinion is less than satisfactory. It is therefore necessary to prioritise the presentation of Poland's attractions, elaborate a formula of efficient promotion of Poland's position papers and demonstrate benefits, which are to accrue from EU enlargement also to its member states. Poland's membership of NATO will also furnish a good opportunity to spread the knowledge of Poland abroad, highlighting our country's regional importance, an enhanced security of foreign investments in Poland and the process of reconciliation and co-operation with our neighbours. It will be of paramount importance in 1999 to furnish the élites and nations of central and Eastern Europe with exhaustive information on the consequences of Poland's membership of NATO and accession negotiations with the EU. The promotion of the country's economy is the obvious task set before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acting in co-operation with the Ministry of Economy and other government departments. This promotion will also be served by the Polish missions abroad popularising information on those of the recently inaugurated reforms, which are also of importance to our foreign partners. Poland's cultural and scientific track record is our major attraction. We can cash in on it when we translate the promotion of culture into a global dialogue to be inaugurated and pursued by our creative artists and scientists with their counterparts wherever they are. The events this year commemorative of Chopin and Conrad are important promotional ventures in their own right as they highlight not only the European but also the world impact of some elements of Poland's cultural heritage. In conjunction with the recent Mickiewicz Anniversary, the Slowacki Year can open a new chapter in our cultural relations with our neighbours in the east. A prerequisite for stepping up the efficiency of promotional activities conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is hammering out new formulae of co-operation between different government departments responsible for planning and financing such activities. We have got off the ground the process of reconfiguring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' missions abroad to make them equal to the new challenges facing them in the realm of promotion. New-formula Polish Institutes will be opened in Sankt Petersburg, Tel Aviv, New York and Bucharest. May I now proceed to review some international legal issues, which are about to be taken up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Screening international agreements to establish their conformity with the Polish Constitution will be one of the most important tasks for 1999 pursuant to Article 241 paragraph 2 of the Constitution. This will require putting in order the Treaty Archive and carrying on with the labour-intensive review of bilateral agreements concluded so far. Lack of up-to-date regulations concerning international agreements makes difficult the implementation of the country's treaty policy. In early 1999 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a bill on international agreements under the relevant provision of the Constitution. Among a number of problems, which may have an impact on Polish-German relations is the above-mentioned question of Polish citizens' claims to payment for forced labour in the Third Reich. A solution of this problem, which must consist in awarding compensation to all Polish citizens-victims of forced labour, will require continuous contacts with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. A collective claim advanced by Polish citizens, former forced labourers resident in the United States, will keep the US government involved as well. The Polish-Russian relations, in turn, may be influenced by the question of compensation for Polish victims of Stalinist terror, especially former inmates of prison camps in Siberia, of return of Polish archives or regulation of shipping in the Pilawa Bay. Return of property to natural persons, planned to take place in the near future, bristles with many difficult international legal problems. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is involved in work on re-privatisation legislation, will keep the legislators informed on the international legal aspects of the laws being drafted and their influence upon Poland's international image. Harmonisation of the Polish legal system with the acquis communautaire is of paramount importance for Poland's integration into the European Union. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be co-operating with the Committee for European Integration and its Chief Negotiator in the pursuit of this objective. Poland's entry into NATO also calls for an adjustment of the Polish legal system to enable it to cope with our membership obligations. Adjustment-related work has actually got under way and no delays have been registered in this field of endeavour. The growing commitment of this country to military co-operation with other countries involves joint exercises with foreign troops and their movement across Polish territory. The legal foundations for foreign troops' stay in and transit through the territory of the Republic of Poland will be laid by a law drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The country's administrative reform has resulted in a substantial amendment of the rules governing the conduct of regional policy and cross-border co-operation. It is incumbent upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide a compass for this policy and stay actively involved in the training of voivodship-level officials who will be responsible for the pursuit of goals set for voivodships (provinces) in this particular area. Honourable Deputies, Poland can count on the full understanding of and expect a high level of support for its foreign policy from Polish expatriate communities. Lending our support to our countrymen in east and west will be an important goal of Polish foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue its efforts aimed at securing for persons of Polish descent and Polish nationals living abroad social and political status proper to their rank in their countries of residence. We shall be monitoring observance of legal regulations relating to ethnic and national minorities and instances of their abuse will be matched by our appropriate interventions. Helping young people of Polish extraction to gain or improve their access to Polish language learning facilities, and/or to receive education in Polish, especially in government-run schools in their countries of residence, is an important task for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time we shall be promoting the Polish economy in areas with Polish communities and, with the help of the latter, among non-Polish communities of their countries of residence. Polish organisations and initiatives assisting the integration of Polish émigré communities with Polish nationals temporarily living abroad will be receiving our full support. We intend to liase closely with scientists and creative artists of Polish extraction living abroad. To be effective, such activities require much better co-operation of agencies responsible for providing assistance to Polish organisations abroad, and for forging stronger bonds between Polish émigré communities and the Old Country, as well as strengthening the co-ordinating role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The expatriate communities over the world also mobilise local support for ventures serving to promote Poland and the Polish economy. They should be properly supplied with relevant information to be able to commit themselves more effectively to such activities. Our special attention is due to the problem of regulation of the Polish citizenship of persons of Polish descent resident abroad. A review must be carried out of citizenship agreements concluded by Poland with other countries, with due account taken of both the relevant Polish domestic legal regulations and the corresponding laws of the countries concerned. The course of the entire process is also conditional on a new citizenship law to be passed by the Sejm. Honourable Deputies, The welfare of our citizens abroad and the interests of our country are an overriding concern and the prime responsibility of our consular service. In 1999 new Polish consulates will be opened in Irkutsk and Sarajevo respectively. Harmonisation of Polish visa policy with the EU system will require, first and foremost, implementation of the relevant provisions of Article 100c of the EC Treaty and of the Council Regulation (EEC) No 2317/95 and, following the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, also Article 73 J of the Treaty. Candidates to the Union will be obliged to embrace the Schengen regulations in their entirety following their ratification by all the EU member states. The obligation to accept the Schengen regulations in their entirety further entails the need to implement into Polish law individual regulations and procedures of the Treaty, including those related to the protection of state borders, police and customs co-operation and the creation of an Information System along the lines of the SIS. The leading role in this regard should be played by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. The tightening up of Poland's state borders, however, should not be tantamount to their effective closure to some states, especially those in the east (such as Ukraine), but rather should ensure a more efficient border control. Mr President, Mr Speaker, Prime Minister, Honourable Members, The drama of the Albanian population of Kosovo is unfolding before our very eyes. The international community cannot fail to display its own strength and stamina in the face of violence. The drama did not start on 24 March when the North Atlantic Alliance launched military action against the Slobodan Milosevic regime. This drama has been in progress for 10 years. It has grown in intensity over the past 12 months when the Yugoslav government, in breach of international agreements, embarked on a round of massive ethnic cleansing under the pretext of waging war on the KLA. In under one year the Yugoslav machinery of repression forced hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians to leave their homes and their land, stripping them of their elementary human rights. Let us remember: aggression was conceived in the minds of ideologues to be deployed on the ground by practitioners of Greater Serbia. The government of Slobodan Milosewic is responsible for the preparation and perpetration of outrages on citizens of his own country. The Slobodan Milosevic government is responsible for the continuation and intensification of these criminal acts over the past weeks. That government is also to blame for rejecting a reasonable compromise proposal put forward during the negotiations at Rambouillet by the Contact Group and approved by representatives of Kosovo's Albanian population. There is no way of interpreting the NATO operations - started in consultation and with participation of Poland as a member of the Alliance - other than as an expression given by NATO to its unwavering conviction that the policy being pursued by Belgrade poses a direct threat to the fundamental values which underpin both the international order and what we know as the United Nations system. The Albanians of Kosovo should have restored to them both their rights and their properties from which they have been violently expelled. That is why we believe, together with other NATO members, that conditions must be created for an effective elimination of the policy of ethnic cleansing pursued by the Milosevic regime. The Kosovo Albanians who in Macedonia and Albania are enduring levels of subsistence too shocking for description, must be provided conditions for their safe and unhindered return to Kosovo. Such conditions would emerge following a pullout from Kosovo of all Serb repression squads and upon arrival at the scene of international peacekeeping forces. In the meantime, one would have to remember all the agreements concluded and then broken by the government of Slobodan Milosevic, and all the promises he made and then failed to deliver on. The Albanians and the Serbs who had until the outbreak of the anti-Albanian ethnic cleansing operations lived in Kosovo have the right to adequate, effective defence. The will to conclude a political agreement on Kosovo completes the list of required minimum conditions without the fulfilment of which the credibility of Belgrade's declaration will also be minimal. The Serbs' national pride, which the Poles have always respected and placed a high value on, is today being treated instrumentally by the crime-motivated government in Belgrade, and at a cost of great human suffering. I do believe, however, that this is but a tragic episode in the annals of Serbia, a country so close to us. We wish for Serbia to return to the fold of the European family of democratic nations. There is a chance for a just peace and it must be promptly seized. Honourable Members, The government of the Republic of Poland a few days ago took a decision to considerably expand the range of its humanitarian aid to victims of ethnic cleansing and, our resources permitting, to provide facilities for a temporary stay in Poland of a number of Kosovar refugees. These actions by the Polish government are supplementary to aid being spontaneously organised by non-governmental organisations. Solidarity with the refugees, being demonstrated by our citizens, deserves respect. The drama of Kosovo is our concern. The English poet John Donne wrote: "No man is an island; every man is a piece of the Continent, part of the Main; if a clod be washed away by the Sea, Europe is less, as well as a Promontory were, as well as if a Manor of they friends or of thine owne were; any mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind: And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls: It tolls for thee." Honourable Members, Poland is safe as never before this century. We are facing difficult challenges, which can, nevertheless, galvanise our society into action. In its activities on the international scene, the government expects support from all the political forces represented in this House. We know where we differ. But we also know that when it comes to foreign and security policy - Poland is one. Poland speaks with one voice. Thank you.